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8 November 1975

*Plend. 5 j.*

Points to Address at the Strategic Warning Review

Group Meeting, Monday, 10 November 1975

A. ISSUING A STRATEGIC WARNING NOTICE (SWN)

1. To date no official procedures exist for issuing a Strategic Warning Notice.

-- We hope we can arrive at a general agreement today concerning this problem so that my staff and SWS officers can draft an appropriate set of procedures for Strategic Warning Notices. We would, after further discussion with this Group, plan to send a document to USIB for approval. This, by the way, was the route we followed when we established procedures for the issuance of Alert Memoranda.


2. A number of items need to be discussed and clarified before efficient procedures can be formulated.

- One of the first questions to ask, obviously, is when should a Strategic Warning Notice be issued?
- What types of situations warrant such a notice, rather than, for example, an Alert Memorandum?
- Other questions include: Who may initiate or propose a SWN? Who has responsibility for preparation and coordination of the SWN? (We would recommend that an SWN be proposed by the Special Assistant to the DCI for

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Strategic Warning. The proposal should be addressed to the DCI, and the decision should rest with him.)

3. The next question is how to issue a Notice?

-- Should USIB agencies be consulted in the decision to issue a SWN? Should they be consulted in the preparation?

-- If the answer is yes to these questions, who does the SWS contact in these agencies, and what communications techniques should be utilized (gray line, CONTEXT, etc.)?

-- What procedures should the SWS use for operations during duty hours?--during non-duty hours?

4. What should the SWN contain? (At a minimum we suggest: a statement concerning the nature of warning and the reasons for it, the collection efforts recommended, and the degree of coordination.)

5. Once the decision to issue a SWN is approved, what should the dissemination be? Should it receive basically the same distribution as the Alert Memoranda? (A copy of which is attached.)

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B. SWS ACCESS TO APPROPRIATE INTELLIGENCE

1. Before discussing SWS problems of access to all appropriate intelligence, I would like to reflect briefly on the past.

-- [redacted] the old

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Watch Committee did not always receive all intelligence "pertinent to its mission." Vital information was sometimes withheld on the grounds of sensitivity.

-- Compartmentation kept various categories of information from the Watch Committee analysts, including sensitive clandestine reports and eyes-only reporting from various agencies. (This was particularly noteworthy when the IC Staff went back to assess the Community's activities prior to and during the Middle East crisis of 1973--only to find the Watch Committee did not receive all the intelligence that was available.)

2. Today the situation has improved. CIA/DDO personnel have been involved in the Alert Memorandum process. They have also been made aware of SWS requirements, and we believe that suitable arrangements have now been made between DDO and the SWS.

-- However, I would like to ask [redacted] if they care to discuss this item further--not only DDO reports but also other intelligence that is being forwarded from other agencies. In other words, is the SWS getting the intelligence it needs to accomplish its mission?

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C. DISTRIBUTION OF THE SWS MONTHLY REPORT

1. At the 9 October USIB meeting, General Tighe suggested that a new look might be taken at distribution of the Monthly Report to assure that the right people have access to it.

-- We note that, within the Community, a total of 156 copies of the Monthly are disseminated outside the SWS, with the breakdown as indicated on the attached chart (which also shows the dissemination of the Alert List).

-- I would recommend that each agency take a look at their respective requirements for this publication to determine whether the right people are getting the Monthly Report.

2. Another potential problem for some agencies may be classification. The SWS issues only one edition of the Monthly Report, and this often includes GAMMA controlled items. Does this present any significant problems?

3. One other topic we should address is whether to distribute the Monthly Report outside the Community, e.g., PFIAB, NSC Staff, etc.

-- At the 3 November USIB meeting, Mr. Colby noted that it might be a good idea to forward the Monthly Report to our "operational brethern." I am inclined to agree and, unless there are strong objections, recommend that the SWS distribute the Monthly Report to

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appropriate non-USIB agencies with proper classification procedures being maintained. At a minimum, we suggest the following agencies be included: PFIAB, NSC Staff, WHSR, JCS (J-3), and the U & S Commands.

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D. STAFFING THE SWS (BACKGROUND DATA ATTACHED)

1. As noted at two recent USIB meetings, three agencies still have not assigned analysts to the SWS, specifically State, Army and Navy.

- While I am aware of the problems involved, I would urge these agencies to look into this matter as soon as possible. The SWS has a small staff and is now 30% under strength.
- In this regard, I am pleased to learn that the Navy is apparently taking positive steps to fill its SWS position.

Attachment

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Background Data on SWS Staffing Problems

DIA, CIA, and NSA were asked to provide two analysts each to the SWS. State, Army, Navy, and Air Force were asked to provide one analyst each. To date all agencies have complied except State, Army, and Navy.

State/INR

-- [ ] has expressed interest in filling State's quota of one analyst. State personnel have visited the SWS facilities to check on operations, but no one has expressed a desire to accept the job.

Army

-- MG Aaron has indicated that Army does not intend to provide a full-time analyst. He claims to have already provided the disbanded National Indications Center with Army personnel that have--over the years--been absorbed within DIA. Thus he feels DIA should fill the Army slot. General Aaron has stated that an analyst on the ACSI staff would be made available on a liaison basis.

Navy

-- We understand that RADM Inman has recently received a recommendation that a Navy representative be assigned to the SWS for a one year period. While

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Admiral Inman has not yet indicated what action he desires, it appears that the Navy is now taking positive steps to fill the SWS position.

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